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The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl had a permanent and profound 
impact on the philosophical formation of Paul Ricoeur. One could truly say, 
paraphrasing Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s brilliant 1959 essay “The 
Philosopher and his Shadow,”1 that Husserl is the philosopher in whose 
shadow Ricoeur, like Merleau-Ponty, also stands, the thinker to whom he 
constantly returns. Husserl is Ricoeur’s philosopher of reflection, par 
excellence. Indeed, Ricoeur always invokes Husserl when he is discussing a 
paradigmatic instance of contemporary philosophy of “reflection” and also 
of descriptive, “eidetic” phenomenology.2 Indeed, I shall argue in this 
chapter that Husserl’s influence on Ricoeur was decisive and provided a 
methodology which is permanently in play, even when it has to be 
concretized and mediated by hermeneutics, as Ricoeur proposes after 1960. 
Of course, Ricoeur never met Husserl, who died in 1938, personally. He was 
only sixteen years of age when Husserl gave his famous lectures in Paris in 
1929, but Ricoeur was life-long friends with Husserl’s former student, Eugen 
Fink (1905-1970), and with Fr. Herman Leo Van Breda (1911-1974),3 who had 
been active, with Fink and Malvine Husserl, in saving the Husserl Nachlass 
and establishing the Husserl Archives in Leuven in 1939. 
Ricoeur himself has frequently acknowledged that Husserl and Gabriel 
Marcel were his first real philosophical mentors.4 Ricoeur had met Marcel 
already earlier on in 1934, when he was studying at the Sorbonne for his 
aggregation. The young Ricoeur attended several of Marcel’s soirées at his 
home. They continued to correspond, especially while Ricoeur was in the 
prisoner-of-war camp in Germany. Marcel was the first person Ricoeur 
visited after the war, and there were in contact until Marcel’s death. 
Nevertheless, Ricoeur records that he drew away from Marcel’s philosophy 
precisely because of its absence of “conceptual structure.”5 It was Husserl 
who provided this conceptual structure for Ricoeur’s philosophy. 
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty was also a long-term friend and colleague of 
Ricoeur’s, and together they were involved in informal reading groups of 
Husserl’s philosophy and in the founding and running of the Husserl 
Archives in Paris until Merleau-Ponty’s sudden death in 1961. Ricoeur was 
one of a small group of philosophers – along with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 
– who were reading Husserl in France in the late 1930s, until the outbreak of 
the Second World War disrupted their activities. Ricoeur’s Husserl is the 
Husserl who entered into France through the work of Eugen Fink, Gaston 
Berger, Emmanuel Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty. The sole available primary 
text in French was the Méditations Cartésiennes,6 published in 1931, along with 
a special issue of the Revue Internationale de Philosophie which appeared in 
1939 to mark the death of Husserl and which contained The Origin of 
Geometry fragment,7 that later was included in Walter Biemel’s edition of 
Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences in 1954.8 Another important source was 
Levinas’ 1930 study of Husserl’s intuitionism.9 
Until he began to present himself primarily as a hermeneuticist and, 
then, as a philosopher of language, around 1960, Ricoeur situated himself 
squarely in the tradition of French (Husserlian) phenomenology, with its 
existential orientation towards humanism and freedom, although he was 
from the start critical of Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of freedom in particular 
and kept himself at a distance from Sartre’s work generally. Heidegger’s 
presence in Ricoeur’s work (largely through the influence of Jean Beaufret) is 
much more ambiguous and would require a separate study.10 Both Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty were deeply interested in Husserl’s conception of 
intentionality and in particular offered novel phenomenological accounts 
imagination (Sartre)11 and perception (Merleau-Ponty). Ricoeur initially came 
to Husserl from a somewhat different angle, namely the existentialism of 
Marcel and Jaspers, but he went on to embrace and extend descriptive 
phenomenology primarily to cover the domain of voluntary action and 
human praxis informed by an ethical sensitivity.  
According to this French tradition, Ricoeur puts Husserl in 
confrontation with Levinas, Freud, Heidegger, and others – but Ricoeur 
always felt the need to go back and situate his own thinking on some 
particular issue with regard to Husserl.  Husserl is his “point de repère” and 
even Kant is understood in relation to Husserl,12 and Ricoeur believes 
Husserl diagnoses an “implicit phenomenology behind the Kantian 
epistemology.”13 Especially in the 1940s and 1950s, Ricoeur carried out an 
intensive study of Husserl’s texts, not just Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations, 
but also Ideas II,14 when it appeared in the Husserliana edition in 1952, and 
which Ricoeur immediately reviewed in detail.15 
Ricoeur discusses Husserl in all his major books up until 1960, when he 
moves on from his methodology of reflection and begins his hermeneutic 
explorations of symbol and myth16 and then again explicitly in later texts in 
the nineteen eighties such as Time and Narrative (especially Volume Three).17 
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In his early works, Ricoeur offered penetrating phenomenological, “eidetic” 
descriptions of the nature of the will, of human voluntary action and 
motivation, habit, and the involuntary, the nature of imagination and 
symbolism, even expanding his horizon to conceptualizing the experience of 
evil and the unconscious. He addresses all the central aspects of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, from the commitment to the science of essential truths 
founded in intuition, the project of determining the “significance of 
significance,” the genesis of meaning, the true nature of the epoché and the 
reduction, the critique of Cartesian intellectualism, the nature of the 
transcendental ego, the problem of the constitution of the other, and 
Husserl’s problematic conception of the life-world. Later he will return to 
the importance of the “hyletic phenomenology” of inner time consciousness, 
in Volume Three of Time and Narrative, as well as discussing Husserl’s 
egology in Oneself as Another.  
Ricoeur himself had originally studied at the University of Rennes with 
Roland Dalbiez (1893-1976), a Catholic and a close friend of Jacques 
Maritain, who was one of the first to introduce Sigmund Freud into France, 
and who placed psychoanalysis in dialogue with then contemporary 
Thomism.18 One can see the influence of Dalbiez in Ricoeur’s 1965 analysis of 
Freud, Freud and Philosophy,19 but, in regard to an exposure to Husserl, 
Ricoeur was more or less an autodidact. Ricoeur’s initial licence ès lettres from 
Rennes was primarily a teaching qualification. Ricoeur unfortunately failed 
the entry examination for the École Normale Supérieure and then entered 
the Sorbonne in 1934 to study for the agrégation examination which he 
obtained in 1935. He then did his year of military service and began teaching 
in a lycée at Lorient. 
At the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, Ricoeur enlisted in 
the army and was reputedly a good soldier, but he was captured on 7 June 
1940.20 He was sent to a prisoner of war camp in Germany, where he 
occupied himself with his intensive reading, translation and commentary on 
Husserl’s Ideas, which he eventually obtained in 1943.21 While in captivity at 
the Oflag II-B camp in Pomerania, during the War until 1945, Ricoeur began 
secretly to translate Husserl’s Ideas I into French, and this translation was 
eventually published in 1950.22 In the camp, he also began an annotation of 
Ideas I, written clandestinely, and also published in 1950. Imprisoned with 
Ricoeur were other intellectuals, including another philosopher Mikel 
Dufrenne (1910-1995), with whom Ricoeur later co-authored a book on 
Jaspers.23 In the prison camp, Ricoeur had access to some books, through the 
Red Cross and read in particular Karl Jaspers but he also had a copy of 
Husserl Ideas which he laboriously translated and on which he commented 
(writing in a miniscule hand in the margins of the text).24 Ricoeur’s 
translation and commentary on Ideas I later became the minor thesis for his 
doctorat-ès-lettres at the Sorbonne,25 while his major thesis was his Philosophie 
de la volonté. Tome I: Le volontaire et l’involontaire (Freedom and Nature: The 
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Voluntary and the Involuntary).26 Ricoeur’s doctoral degree was awarded on 
April 29, 1950. In the meantime, Ricoeur had taken up a lecturer position at 
the University of Strasbourg from 1948 until 1956, when he was appointed to 
a chair at the Sorbonne. 
The 1950s was Ricoeur’s phenomenological decade, inaugurated by his 
translation and commentary on Husserl’s Ideas (1950)27 and also by his 
groundbreaking phenomenological study of the will, published as Volume 
One of his Philosophy of the Will: The Voluntary and the Involuntary. Ricoeur 
also published a series of essays on phenomenology which were later 
collected as A l’école de la phénoménologie.28 After the War, Ricoeur was active 
with Gaston Berger, Merleau-Ponty, Jean Wahl, and others, in establishing of 
the Husserl Archives in Paris. Indeed, shortly after the war ended, in 
January 1947, Ricoeur visited the Husserl Archives in Leuven, Belgium.29 
Ricoeur took copies of Husserl’s manuscripts, which Van Breda had given 
him, to Strasbourg.30 Riceour would soon begin lecturing at the University of 
Strasbourg, where he replaced Jean Hyppolyte (1907-1968), who had moved 
to the Sorbonne. Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, and others, had already been 
sharing Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts provided by Van Breda. 
Already in 1942, during the war, Van Breda would make occasional trips to 
Paris by train, and secretly provide Jean Cavaillès and his circle with copies 
of Husserl’s manuscripts, which they eagerly discussed. Eventually, in 1957, 
the Husserl Archives in Paris was officially opened – with Gaston Berger, 
Paul Ricoeur, Jean Wahl, Jean Hyppolite and Merleau-Ponty, among the 
founders. Indeed, Ricoeur took over as director of the Paris Husserl 
Archives in 1961, following the sudden death of Merleau-Ponty. 
In the fifties Ricoeur saw himself initially primarily as a 
phenomenologist and his early works were phenomenological eidetic 
studies of themes such as the nature of the will which is approached through 
the reduction. Ricoeur moved in the circles of Husserlian phenomenology. 
In 1951, for instance, he participated in the Brussels conference on the 
current state of phenomenology with Merleau-Ponty and Fink where he 
presented his paper on “Methods and Tasks of a Phenomenology of the 
Will.”31 In an interview with Charles Reagan, Ricoeur recalled that he began 
“with a reflexive method borrowed from Husserl, with a certain existential 
influence similar to that of Merleau-Ponty.”32 The aim was to arrive at the 
“principal structures of mental life.” His original problem was the 
phenomenological project of identifying the essential structure of the will 
and of voluntary action, as part of an overall anthropology of what he came 
to call “the capable human” (l’homme capable).33 It is difficult to 
overemphasize the importance of Husserl’s Ideas I in Ricoeur’s overall 
conception of method in Freedom and Nature. He cites Husserl’s comment 
that the will needed to be approached in terms of the noetic-noematic 
structure of intentionality. Ricoeur’s intensive reading of a single book of 
Husserl contributes to a particular conception of phenomenology as a 
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method. It is a method of reflection, grounded in intuition, but –through the 
epoché and reduction—abstracted from all actuality and contemplating 
essences in their pure ideality. Ricoeur wants an eidetics of the will but in 
the end he also wants to advance to a new ontology of the will. He is 
somewhat suspicious of phenomenologists moving too quickly to the 
existential features of the life-world (as exemplified in Husserl’s Crisis). 
Ricoeur believes one must remain longer with the noetic-noematic 
intentional structures in order to achieve clarity. As he proclaims: “In the 
early stages at least, phenomenology must be structural.”34 Ricoeur is also 
critical of aspects of Husserl’s approach. Perhaps most crucially, he rejects 
Husserl’s classification of willing (along with memory, imagination, etc.) as 
a form of “representation” (Vergegenwärtigung). This characterization, he 
believes, is simply a Husserlian prejudice.35 
Gradually, especially as Ricoeur began to appreciate the religious texts 
that discussed willing (including Augustine), issues of expressive, 
metaphorical language and symbolism came to the fore – and, thus, the need 
for a hermeneutic perspective—especially when he began to contemplate the 
issue of evil and of the bad will. Indeed, psychoanalysis also began to insist 
itself at this point, also because of the problem of the “bad will.” As Ricoeur 
noted: “The break with this method [eidetic phenomenology] came from the 
recognition of evil as a fundamental structure of the will.”36 As a result of this 
new approach to evil, L’Homme faillible (1960, Fallible Man) goes beyond the 
purely phenomenological analyses of evil found in Freedom and Nature and 
moves in a more existential and symbolic direction, although he still begins 
from a phenomenological analysis (and indeed an encounter with Kant). 
This new move towards the hermeneutic interpretation of language and 
symbolism is complemented by The Symbolism of Evil, which originally 
appeared as Part Two of The Voluntary and the Involuntary.37  
Arising from his work on freedom and the free will, Ricoeur was drawn 
to a consideration of the nature of evil and especially how the fundamental 
truths of the human condition are expressed in symbols in the writings of 
the great religions, in a way that was not immediately conceptualized. This 
led Ricoeur to realize that phenomenology cannot proceed by concepts alone 
but had to find a way of explicating the rich meanings embedded in texts, 
narratives and symbols. But even here there is a Husserlian intonation. 
Intentionality is already a desire or “will to speak” (vouloir dire) and 
phenomenology is a logos and especially a desire to name.38 The truth of 
symbols, Ricoeur proclaims, is truth, in the Husserlian sense, under the 
epoché – the fulfillment of an intention.39 Symbols, for Ricoeur, provoke 
thinking-- le symbole donne à penser (“the symbol sets us thinking”)40 through 
a kind of double intentionality: the literal, obvious meaning points beyond 
itself to a deeper meaning. Symbols are inherently dynamic and interwoven 
in larger narratives; and newly introduced symbols in a culture act to 
destroy the previously accepted symbols. Symbols left on their own thicken 
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into idolatry, Ricoeur writes. Symbols, on the other hand, give birth to 
understanding through interpretation. Symbols mediate what cannot be 
conceptualized directly. 
Even after the turn to hermeneutics, phenomenology continues to have 
a prominent role. In his major 1965 book on Freud, Freud and Philosophy, 
Ricoeur compares and contrasts Husserl’s epoché and reduction to 
consciousness and Freud’s reduction of consciousness (to something 
deeper).41 Ricoeur had been attending Jacques Lacan’s seminars from 1960 to 
1963,42 and had already been giving papers on the unconscious in connection 
with his exploration of evil. However, Lacan was reportedly extremely 
angry with Ricoeur’s book on Freud, because it scarcely acknowledged his 
own work on Freud. One of Lacan’s acolytes, J.-P. Valabrega, even wrote a 
review of Ricoeur’s book accusing him of plagiarizing Lacan and Ricoeur 
was forced to reply.43 Even in his analysis of Freud, Ricoeur tries to think of 
him in relation to Husserl. Indeed, Ricoeur explicitly states that part of the 
project of Freud and Philosophy is to confront Freud’s theories with the 
resources of Husserl’s phenomenology.44 Thus he contrasts Husserl’s epoché 
to consciousness (which he describes as a kind of “displacement” with 
Freud’s epoché of consciousness.45 Ricoeur claims that no reflective 
philosophy has come as close to Freud’s exploration of the unconscious as 
that of Husserl with his understanding of passivity. Husserl’s sedimentation 
is seen as close to Freud’s account of the manner dreams take up symbols 
that it simply finds in consciousness.46 Indeed, Ricoeur describes 
phenomenology in quite psychoanalytic terms: 
Thus phenomenology begins by а humiliation or wounding of the 
knowledge belonging to immediate consciousness.47 
But Ricoeur raises questions that push beyond phenomenology, e.g. how far 
can the transcendental ego be deceived about itself?48 Furthermore, for 
Ricoeur, psychoanalysis is not a reflective discipline in the manner of 
phenomenology. He writes: 
Phenomenology is а reflexive discipline; the methodological 
displacement it sets into operation is the displacement of reflection 
with respect to immediate consciousness.49 
Phenomenology always means, for Ricoeur, certainly from The Voluntary and 
the Involuntary, but through to his later works, the methodology of extracting 
essential meanings from lived experiences, as he puts it in his 1975 study, La 
Métaphore vive (The Rule of Metaphor).50 Phenomenology is carried out in 
reflection not in introspection. Thus, in his 1960 study, Fallible Man,51 Ricoeur 
stated that he made use of the “method of reflection” and especially 
employed Husserl’s notion of “horizon.”52 Indeed, Fallible Man begins with a 
discussion of the phenomenology of perception and the nature of perceptual 
“excess” as well as givenness in “profiles” (Abschattungen). Looking back on 
his earlier work, Ricoeur says that already in Fallible Man he took over the 
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Husserlian concept of perspective borrowed from the phenomenology of 
perception and applied it to the practical sphere to point to the essential 
finitude and one-sidedness of our desires, motivations, habits, etc. But then, 
Ricoeur notes the “transcendence of signification over perception, of 
speaking over perspective,”53 which leads him to recognize the importance of 
interpretation (involving a detour through Aristotle’s De Interpretatione). 
Ricoeur also maintains that Husserlian reflective responsibility 
(Selbstbeantwortung) is explicitly an ethical enterprise. Making decisions, 
willing, are forms of taking responsibility, ownership of one’s deeds and 
one’s deeds are always part of the world, “inscribed upon the tissue of the 
world.”54 
Ricoeur considers phenomenology primarily as a descriptive discipline 
founded in intuition. He maintains that all phenomenology “takes place on 
the level of an intuition of an eidos.”55 There is an intuitionism at the basis of 
Husserl’s philosophy, a point also emphasized by Levinas in his The Theory 
of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology (1930), which was also known to 
Ricoeur. Already from his early commentary on Ideas I, Ricoeur recognizes 
that Husserl’s groundbreaking conception of the intentionality of 
consciousness, and its power of going beyond itself, is very close to the 
existential notion of the transcendence of human existence.56 However, 
Ricoeur also recognizes the importance of the reduction and precisely, given 
the formulation of Husserl’s Ideas, the suspension of “belief in the world.” 
One must “conquer” oneself as a human being in order to apprehend oneself 
as a pure subject and make visible the noetic-noematic structures of 
consciousness.57 But Ricoeur also notes the inherent egoism within Husserl’s 
philosophy and its failure to fully articulate the other as other since the other 
is always constituted through analogization and pairing with oneself.58 
From the beginning, moreover, Ricoeur was a persistent critic of 
Husserl’s turn to transcendental idealism, which is announced in print in 
Ideas I but which had been simmering since 1907. According to Ricoeur, 
Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, which first appeared in French, translated by 
Emmanuel Levinas and Gabrielle Pfeiffer, and Husserl’s 1930 Afterword 
(Nachwort) to his Ideen, are extreme expressions of this idealism. Ricoeur 
recognizes that Husserl’s Descartes is a Neo-Kantian construct, the cogito is 
the transcendental ego,59 and Husserl completely ignores the role of God as 
the second certainty in Descartes’ system. 
Husserl’s Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary 
published in 1950 (volume one) has a very large phenomenological 
component, although it is modeled on Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy of Existence, 
which Ricoeur had read in the detention camp.60 Ricoeur begins from the 
standpoint of intentionality, which he later interpret as signifying, as 
“vouloir-dire,” wanting to say. Phenomenology is descriptive rather than 
explanatory. The will is to be given an eidetic analysis. As Ricoeur says: 
“The axis of the method is a description of the intentional, practical, and 
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affective structures of the Cogito in a Husserlian manner.”61 On the other 
hand, drawing on Marcel and Jaspers, incarnate existence must be respected 
as the ultimate mystery. There are aspects of willing and practical life that 
need to be approached from a different angle, from what he will, at that 
time, call a “poetics” and “symbolics”. 
Freedom and Nature accepts the opposition expressed in Merleau-Ponty 
between scientific objective thought (the view from nowhere) and the 
perspective of subjectivity. As he puts it, the desire of reflective 
consciousness is to be total, to be above all perspective and self-sufficient. 
Reflective consciousness wants to be free of the grip of the passions. Ricoeur 
believes that Husserl’s –and indeed Merleau-Ponty’s-- phenomenology had 
placed too much emphasis on perception, memory and imagination, and 
other forms of “representative” consciousness and had not sufficiently 
treated the will and the emotions and affective life generally, which are 
literally incorporated into the world. What I do is not just something in 
consciousness, it is an event in the world and not just in my body. 
Against Sartre, Ricoeur denies that the experience of freedom is entirely 
open-ended. In fact, the experience of voluntary movements (e.g. of the 
body) always involve running up against the involuntary, which includes 
the unconscious domain, drives, character traits, mechanisms which simply 
take place in nature (such as recoil, shock, and so on). The voluntary can 
only take place against the background of the involuntary. Emotions, needs, 
habits, belong largely to the sphere of the involuntary. The involuntary 
cannot be apprehended directly since it has no sense until it is taken up by 
the voluntary: “Only the living interrelationship between the voluntary and 
the involuntary is intelligible.”62  
In Freedom and Nature, inspired by Husserl, and of course by Merleau-
Ponty, Ricoeur gives a detailed discussion of the “lived body” (Leib) and 
discusses aspects of Husserl’s analysis of ‘I can’ (Ich kann). The body is a site 
of movement but also of resistance. The voluntary movement of the body 
has first to overcome the inertia of nature; one literally has to lift one’s body 
from the ground, to stand upright, to move, is always an overcoming of 
gravity and resistance. All of this requires willing at a very basic level: “A 
total absence of willing would be an absence of human being.”63 Actions are 
essentially intentional – I do not just move my arm, I engage in a meaningful 
activity such as writing a letter. There are no decisions without motives64 and 
Ricoeur makes use of Husserl’s and Pfänder’s concept of motivation. 
Furthermore, Ricoeur adopts Scheler’s view that emotions are oriented to 
values. Human projects are driven by values that are apprehended but not 
reflected on. To reflect on values is to uncouple their driving force and allow 
them to be examined in terms of their justificatory character. Ricoeur takes 
over Husserl’s conception of position-taking (Stellungnahme). Once one 
makes a decision, one is thus-and-so decided. Taking a stand, exercising 
control, these activities shape the ego.65 Ricoeur carefully distinguishes 
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between arriving at a decision and the consequent voluntary motion of the 
body.  
Central to Ricoeur’s analysis in Freedom and Nature (even in Volume 
One) is an ontological recognition of human beings as somehow caught in a 
“dialectic” between the finite and the infinite (Ricoeur’s conception of 
dialectic is influenced both by Ricoeur and also by Jean Hyppolite’s studies 
on Hegel). Already in the Introduction to Freedom and Nature, Ricoeur speaks 
of a “fault” or “fissure” (faille, écart) at the very heart of the human: freedom 
(understood in Jasperian terms as transcendence) and the “fault” are the two 
poles between which human existence oscillates. The fault is not part of the 
interplay between the voluntary and the involuntary, but is on a completely 
different level. For Ricoeur, “the fault is absurd”;66 and Fallible Man will take 
up the existential nature of this fault in more detail as a “philosophy of 
fallibility.”67 
Freedom and Nature also draws on Husserl’s analyses of inner time-
consciousness to explicate the manner in which human existence is oriented 
toward the future.68 Time is another area that overlaps between the voluntary 
and the involuntary. Ricoeur also defends the notion (similar to Merleau-
Ponty) of a practical pre-reflexive self-awareness in action which is the basis 
for the ego of reflection.69 
Despite the turn to hermeneutics and, indeed, his deep immersion in 
structuralist and analytic philosophy of language, Ricoeur’s fascination with 
Husserl’s phenomenology continues through the sixties and seventies. In an 
important essay entitled “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,”70 a paper 
presented at the American Philosophical Association in 1975, Riceour 
addresses what he calls the “destiny” of contemporary phenomenology. He 
says that what hermeneutics has “ruined” is the idealistic interpretation of 
phenomenology (as explicated by Husserl himself in the Afterword to his 
Ideas). There is, he believes, a deeper “mutual belonging” between 
phenomenology and hermeneutics. Ricoeur critically challenges Husserl’s 
central idealist claims. He was particularly critical of the Cartesian cogito as 
starting point because for him this immediate beginning was empty unless 
mediated by language, symbols etc. As he had already stated in Freud and 
Philosophy:  
The first truth –I am I think—remains as abstract and empty as it is 
invincible, it has to be “mediated” by the ideas, actions, works, 
institutions, and monuments that objectify it.71 
Ricoeur also rejects Husserl’s assertions concerning the self-founding 
nature of phenomenology. In his 1975 APA address, he takes issue with a 
central claim of Ideas, that all transcendence is dubitable (since it proceeds in 
profiles) and only immanence is indubitable.72 For Ricoeur, Husserl’s pursuit 
of intentionality was weakened precisely by its conceptuality and by its 
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acceptance of perception as the bedrock connection with the world rather 
than practical, voluntary action which is already normative and engaged.  
According to Ricoeur, in this APA address, the first principle of 
hermeneutics is that, prior to objectivity, there is inclusion: “Belonging-to” 
(Zugehörigkeit), a Husserlian concept, has to be conceived hermeneutically; it 
expresses the finitude of knowledge and that all justification rests in a 
network of other justifications.73 All comprehension is mediated by 
interpretation. Ricoeur, like Gadamer, defends the universality of 
interpretation. Ricoeur fastened on hermeneutics somewhat after his initial 
exposure to phenomenology – and hermeneutics come to the fore especially 
in his 1960 The Symbolism of Evil74 and also in Freud and Philosophy (see 
Riceour’s intellectual biography as recounted in the Appendix to Rule of 
Metaphor).75 This leads Ricoeur, in his mature works after 1960, to propose a 
new hermeneutical phenomenology or phenomenological hermeneutics – 
influenced by both Heidegger and Gadamer (but also by the emerging 
French structuralist emphasis on language—but carried out in its own 
distinctive manner.76 Ricoeur’s long engagement with the phenomenology of 
religion also takes on a new dimension after he became friendly with Mircea 
Eliade, during his visits to the University of Chicago in the 1960s. Ricoeur 
had first met Eliade in Paris, introduced by Georges Dumézil. Eliade’s 
penetrating and original analyses of basic, universal symbols (informed also 
by phenomenology) had an enormous influence on Ricoeur. 
As Ricoeur’s thinking developed, he began more and more to see the 
dialectical interpenetration, rather than a dichotomy, between description 
and explanation, and also to see text and action as close in structural form. 
All understanding requires interpretation and interpretation usually 
requires mediation and a detour through texts and other forms of 
sedimented knowledge. As he would put it in The Conflict of Interpretations 
(Le conflit des interpretations, 1969): “My purpose here is to explore the paths 
opened to contemporary philosophy by what could be called the graft of the 
hermeneutical problem onto the phenomenological method” (la greffe du 
problème herméneutique sur la méthode phénoménologique).77 Hermeneutics, for 
Ricoeur, is centered on the “thing” or “matter” (die Sache) of the text and, 
therefore, it is not essentially subjectivist. Husserlian phenomenology, on the 
other hand, practices a “subjectivist hermeneutics”.78 Ricoeur, accepts with 
Heidegger and Gadamer, that the project of hermeneutics is the project of 
self-understanding but self-understanding, for Ricoeur, is an interpretation 
and proceeds through detours and mediation. Identity is a matter of socially 
mediated self-definitions. Ricoeur thinks of the subject as always embedded 
in a social, historical, and linguistic context. His key question is, as Richard 
Kearney has recalled: “d”ou parlez vous?” – “where are you speaking from?”; 
“Where are you coming from?”.79 In this regard, Ricoeur often invokes 
Heidegger’s question in Being and Time: “who is Dasein?” This leads him to 
question the primacy of subjectivity and, indeed, to reinterpret 
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phenomenological intentionality not as self-possession but as openness to 
otherness.  
In his later publications, Ricoeur became particularly focused on 
Husserl’s historical narrative in the Crisis of European Sciences and especially 
by Husserl’s turn to history, which he had already written about in an early 
1949 essay, “Husserl and the Sense of History,” writing about Crisis 
manuscripts which would not be published until some five years later in 
Walter Biemel’s Husserliana edition.80 Ricoeur had even contemplated 
translating the Crisis, but eventually this work was completed by Gérard 
Granel (1930-2000), who had studied with Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean 
Beaufret.81 Ricoeur dubbed Husserl one of the “most unhistorical of 
professors” yet one who was called on by historical events to address the 
role of history in the formation of culture.82 Thus in his Time and Narrative 
Volume One83, Ricoeur invokes Husserl’s notion of “questioning back” 
(Rückfragen) – which he interprets as “genesis of meaning” – as mentioned in 
Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences. In Volume Two of Time and Narrative84, 
which appeared in French in 1984, Ricoeur also expresses his preference for 
the long way of “Questioning Back” that Husserl uses in the Crisis. Ricoeur 
refers to this as “historical intentionality” which he says has its own “noetic 
intention”. Husserl was questioning how Galilean sciences came to 
dominate Western scientific knowledge and frame the West.  Ricoeur is 
fascinated by the fact that Husserl does offer a narrative in the Crisis – a 
narrative of the emergence of modern science through the decisive actions of 
Galileo and others, dividing the subjective-relative properties of the world 
from the so called “subject-independent” properties. There is already 
“narrative configuration”. Ricoeur thinks Husserl’s analysis lays bare what 
is at the essence of historical consciousness.85 Ricoeur wants to resist an easy 
conflation of history with story-telling (as in fictional narratives). He 
recognizes the proximity but also the distance between history and story.  
Husserl plays a much larger role in Time and Narrative Volume Three, in 
dealing with the aporetics of time. Husserl is a dominant presence in this 
volume as Ricoeur discusses Augustine, Kant and Heidegger. Husserl is, for 
Ricoeur, the philosopher of lived temporality, internal time consciousness, 
so, in Volume Three, Ricoeur proclaims the need to examine Husserl closely 
in relation to both Augustine and Kant. Husserl’s aim is to make the 
phenomenon of time appear “by means of an appropriate method,”86 to 
submit the process of time to a direct description. Drawing on Husserl’s 
Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness, objective time, “world time,” is 
excluded in order to focus on inner time, time-consciousness 
(Zeitbewusstsein). All transcendent presuppositions concerning existents are 
excluded. In Time and Narrative, Riceour interprets bracketing not as 
excluding anything but as redirecting the gaze. The apprehension of time is 
now the primary phenomenon under investigation. Husserl identifies a 
priori laws that govern the experience of time – it is a two-dimensionsal 
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series with a fixed order, no two different times can ever be conjoined, every 
time has an earlier and later. The great discoveries of Husserl, for Ricoeur, 
are retention and protention. Ricoeur discusses Husserl’s language and his 
time diagram in some depth. Husserl examines a sound just as Augustine 
examined the words of a Latin chanted hymn, deus creator omnium. This 
sound is, in Husserl’s terminology, a peculiar Zeitobjekt. The “now” is not a 
point but has a transverse or longitudinal intentionality. It has a “durational 
unity” (Dauereinheit). The present is called a source point (Quellpunkt) 
because what runs off from it still belongs to it. Ricoeur’s analysis of 
Husserl’s account of temporarilty is detailed, careful and insightful. He 
clearly sees the importance of Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology of the 
experience of temporality but he also recognizes Husserl’s larger concerns 
with the dynamics of culture and history. 
Ricoeur returns to discuss Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations in his 1990 
study of the self and self-awareness, Soi-même comme un autre (Oneself as 
Another).87 In this case, his specific interest is in Husserl’s version of the 
Cartesian cogito. He praises Husserl’s recognition of the other subject as “the 
intrinsically first other,”88 as well as Husserl’s introduction of the distinction 
between Leib and Körper, which had already featured prominently in Freedom 
and Nature (1950). However, he thinks Husserl never really could 
understand the other except as another “I”.89 These later discussions tend to 
repeat points Ricoeur had made earlier about Husserl and shows that his 
views on Husserl did not really change. Ricoeur also says, in Oneself as 
Another,90 that the notion of horizon taken from Husserl has been present in 
his work from the beginning, and, of course, he also uses the notion of 
horizon in The Rule of Metaphor. 
It is clear that Husserlian phenomenology permeates Ricoeur’s oeuvre 
from start to finish. Ricoeur had an essentially phenomenological approach 
to the “eidetics” or the conceptual framework of phenomena. The 
phenomenological reduction (understood both as an eidetic and a 
transcendental reduction) plays a particularly important role for Ricoeur, 
since he regularly employs it to bring into focus the essence of a particular 
phenomenon in its pure possibility without any concern for actuality. He 
described phenomena (e.g. willing) first in their pure possibility and then 
later, as in Freedom and Nature, attempts to discuss an “empirics” of the 
phenomenon. It is undoubtedly also the case that Ricoeur sought always to 
make his work comprehensive and systematic and his books often suffer to 
this extent from having to bear the weight of the relatively artificial 
architectonic that was imposed on the subject matter – hence the distinction 
between the eidetics, the empiric, the symbolic and the mythic in his 
volumes on the Philosophy of the Will. In fact, Ricoeur was an essentially 
dialogical, dialectical and mediational thinker, deeply attuned not just to 
concepts but to the various kinds of texts in which they were embedded and 
acutely aware of different voices. Thus his investigation of metaphor 
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extended from Aristotle through to Max Black, Donald Davidson and 
contemporary analytic philosophy of language as well as to Heidegger and 
Derrida. Already in the 1960s, in lectures in the USA, he was comparing the 
later Husserl with the later Wittgenstein on language,91 or discussing both 
Aristotle and Anscombe on voluntary action alongside Husserlian 
phenomenology. Nevertheless, I believe that Ricoeur’s thought is essentially 
founded in Husserlian phenomenology and cannot be truly understood 
without it. This is evident in an interview Ricoeur gave in July 1991 speaking 
of his work and his engagement with analytic philosophy as found in Oneself 
as Another: 
The detour through analytic philosophy is one more detour in a 
method which rests on detours. Detour/return is the rhythm of my 
philosophical respiration. But I have always been very sensitive to 
the force of argumentation in analytic philosophy, which seems to 
me to accord completely with the great conceptual concerns 
Husserl had, and which phenomenologists after him did not share.92 
It is clear here, in this interview, that the last word is always with Husserl as 
the most rigorous of conceptual theorists, the very model of the philosophy 
of reflection. 
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